Stakeholder analysis on policy environmental impact assessment: a case study on the plastic ban policy in Hainan Province
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摘要:
聚焦政策环境影响评价利益相关方，引入利益相关方理论、协同治理理论等有关理论，建立适用于政策环境影响评价的利益相关方分析方法框架，涵盖利益相关方识别、利益相关方参与、利益相关方分析和利益相关方协同，并将其应用于海南省禁塑政策环境影响评价试点利益相关方分析。结果表明：海南省禁塑政策执行给核心利益相关方成本利益带来明显改变，政府主体有较强的动因推动政策执行，但行政成本增加较大；企业主体最主要的成本变化来源于原材料成本增加，农贸市场商户是受政策影响利益损失最大的主体类型，可能会影响政策执行；政府和企业之间的利益冲突构成行为博弈关系，政府对企业违规行为的惩罚力度越高，企业守规的概率就越高，而企业守规的成本增加越大，政府的监管力度也越大；公众主体尤其是价格敏感型消费者，在禁塑政策执行下可能会采取改变生活消费的行为策略，但具体的改变作用有待观察。据此，从利益共荣、成本分摊、利益约束和利益补偿等方面提出促进利益相关方协同的优化对策建议。研究所构建的利益相关方分析方法有助于识别关键利益群体，厘清利益诉求和政策关联，促使各方以可接受的成本推进政策实施并实现环境公共利益的最大化。
Abstract:The stakeholders in policy environmental impact assessment were focused on, and the stakeholder theory, the collaborative governance theory and other relevant theories were adopted to establish a stakeholder analysis framework accessible for policy environmental impact assessment, including stakeholder identification, stakeholder participation, stakeholder analysis and stakeholder collaboration. The methodology was applied to the stakeholder analysis on the pilot policy environmental impact assessment, namely the plastic ban policy in Hainan Province. The results showed that the costs and benefits taken by the core stakeholders had been significantly changed because of the enforcement of the plastic ban policy. The government had strong motivation to promote the implementation of the policy, with great increase of the administration cost. Enterprises paid higher costs due to the increasement of the raw materials cost, while small merchants in farmer's markets were those who suffered the greatest loss, which may affect the implementation of the policy. The conflict of interests between the government and enterprises constituted a behavioral game relationship. On the one hand, the higher the punishment of the government for enterprises violations, the higher the probability of the enterprise compliance. On the other hand, the greater the cost of the enterprise compliance, the greater the government's supervision. The public, especially the price sensitive consumers, may adopt the behavior change strategies of changing living consumption, but the effect remained to be seen. Accordingly, countermeasures and suggestions were put forward to promote the coordination of stakeholders, from the perspectives of common interest prosperity, cost sharing, interest constraints and interest compensation. The stakeholder analysis methodology developed was helpful to identify key interest groups, clarify interest demands and policy relevance, and urge all parties to promote the implementation of the policy and maximize the environmental public interest with the acceptable cost.
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图 2 海南省禁塑政策利益相关方矩阵
Figure 2. Stakeholder matrix of the plastic ban policy in Hainan Province
表 1 企业与政府的博弈模型
Table 1. Game model between enterprise and government
行为策略 政府 监管（P2） 不监管（1－P2） 企业 守规（P1） B－C A－R B－C A 不守规（1－P1） B－K A－R+K B A－D 注：A为政府获得的财政支持资金；B为企业违规生产销售非降解塑料或伪劣制品的利润。 
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